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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Mathews timely appealed form the district court's judgment of conviction. On
appeal, Mr. Mathews asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress the State's evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Bingham pulled Mr. Mathews over for speeding.

(R., p.9.)

Officer

Bingham asked Mr. Mathews to provide him his driver's license, registration, and proof
of insurance.

(R., p.9.)

While Mr. Mathews was collecting these materials, Officer

Bingham asked him were "he was coming from and going to." (R., pp.9.) Mr. Mathews
told Officer Bingham that he had driven from Kansas to Reno Nevada to gamble, and
that he was on his return trip to Kansas.

(R., pp.9.)

Mr. Mathews then told Officer

Bingham that his proof of insurance was outdated and he continued to look for current
proof of insurance.

(R., p.76.)

Officer Bingham and Mr. Mathews continued to

converse while Mr. Mathews was looking for current proof of insurance.

(R., p.76.)

Mr. Mathews then told the Officer that he had spent the night in a hotel in Reno and
gambled in a gas station and that he also gambled at another establishment. (R., p.9.)
Mr. Mathews then said he planned to drive from Idaho to Wyoming, then to Nebraska
on his way home to Kansas. (R., p.9.) Officer Bingham asked Mr. Mathews if he had
any marijuana, methamphetamine, or cocaine in his vehicle.

(R., p.9.) Mr. Mathews

removed his sunglasses, looked Officer Bingham in the eye, and stated that he did not
have any of the foregoing substances. (R., p.9.)
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During this conversation, Officer Bingham noticed that Mr. Mathews had empty
energy drink containers and food wrappers on the seat and floor of his car. (R., p.9.)
Officer Bingham also noticed an atlas on the passenger's seat opened to the State of
Idaho. (R., p.9.)
After Mr. Mathews provided Officer Bingham his license, registration, and proof
of insurance, Officer Bingham returned to his vehicle.

(R., p.78.)

Based on the

foregoing information, Officer Bingham testified that at that point he abandoned the
original reason for the stop and started an investigation for drug activity.
Tr., p.98, L.1 - p.99, L.1.)

(R., p.78;

Officer Bingham started making phone calls to locate a

canine officer. (R., pp.78-79.) A canine officer was eventually located and over sixteen
minutes after abandoning the original reason for the stop, the drug dog alerted.
(R., pp.9-10, 78-79.) A subsequent search of Mr. Mathews' trunk revealed over twenty-

four pounds of marijuana. (R., p.10.)
Mr. Mathews was charged, by information, with trafficking in marijuana.
(R., pp.29-30.) Mr. Mathews filed a motion to suppress based on a theory that Officer

Bingham unreasonably extended the stop to afford the drug dog time to arrive at the
scene.

(R., pp.52-56.)

The district court denied the motion to suppress because it

determined that the following four factors established reasonable suspicion that
Mr. Mathews was engaging in a drug related activity. (R., pp.67, 74-88.) First, the food
wrappers and energy drinks created a "lived in" appearance in the car.

(R., p.84.)

Second, Mr. Mathews was relying on a paper atlas as opposed to an electronic GPS
system.

(R., p.84.)

Third, Mr. Mathews' travel plans "were suspect" as he was not

taking a direct route back to Kansas.

(R., pp.84-85.)
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Fourth, Mr. Mathews took his

sunglasses off and looked into Officer Bingham's eyes when he denied having any
contraband in his vehicle. (R., p.85.)
There were various factors which were not discussed by the district court which
weighed in favor of Mr. Mathews. Officer Bingham testified that Mr. Mathews did not
appear to be under the influence of controlled substances. (Tr., p.78, Ls.12-15.) In fact,
Officer Bingham testified that the thought that Mr. Mathews might have been under the
influence of a controlled substance never even crossed his mind. (Tr., p.78, Ls.16-22.)
Officer Bingham never testified that Mr. Mathews was coming from or going to a
location associated with drug use or sales. Officer Bingham did not receive a tip that
Mr. Mathews was trafficking or using drugs. According to trial counsel, there was no
"drug activity tip, [no] bloodshot eyes, [and no] fumbling for paperwork." (Tr., p.133,
Ls.15-22.)

The main reason Officer Bingham guessed that Mr. Mathews might be

engaging in illegal activity was his personal belief that Mr. Mathews should have been
tacking a direct route back to Kansas.
Mr. Mathews pleaded guilty to trafficking in marijuana and preserved his ability to
challenge the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. (R., pp.113-114, 121, 124125.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with
three years fixed. (R., pp.133-138.) Mr. Mathews timely appealed. (R., pp.140-143.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mathews' motion to suppress the State's
evidence?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mathews' Motion To Suppress The State's
Evidence

A.

Standard of Review
This Court applies a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to a trial

court's ruling on a motion to suppress.

First, this Court defers to the district court's

findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous.

See, e.g., State v.

Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485 (2009). This Court also gives deference to any implicit
findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence.

State v.

Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1999). Second, this Court reviews de nova the trial
court's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.

Willoughby, 147

Idaho at 485-486.

8.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mathews' Motion To Suppress The
State's Evidence
Mr. Mathews does not challenge the district court's factual findings in this appeal.

As such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts as found by the
district court, the district court erred in denying Mr. Mathews' motion to suppress the
State's evidence. Mr. Mathews submits that the district court's ruling denying his motion
to suppress was not supported both by the evidence and by governing case law, and
that this Court should, therefore, vacate the district court's order denying the motion to
suppress.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Willoughby, 147
Idaho 482, 486 (2009).

The protections of the Fourth Amendment have been
5

incorporated to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).
"When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable."

Id. at 811.

If the

government fails to meet this burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal
search, including later-discovered evidence derived from the original illegal search, is
inadmissible in court. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219 (1999); See also Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).
Even brief detentions of individuals must meet with the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of reasonableness.

Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810.

This means that the

detention must be both justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that originally justified the interference in the first place.

Id.

Limited

detentions of individuals may be permissible where there is reasonable, articulable
suspicion on the part of the officer that the person detained has committed, or is about
to commit, a crime. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, the officer must be able to
point to specific, articulable facts in support of the detention - and this requires more
than a mere hunch on the part of the officer or "inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion." Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). The question of
whether an officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion is evaluated by
examining the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of, or before,
the detention. Id. Moreover, the "scope of the detention must be narrowly tailored to its
underlying justification," and the investigative detention cannot last any longer than is
6

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
(1983).

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500

In fact, an individual "may not be detained even momentarily without

reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Id. at 498.
These same standards apply where the detention at issue is a traffic stop. See,
e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2005). While the purpose of a stop

is not inevitably fixed at the point of the initiation of the traffic stop and may evolve
based upon additional information coming to light, any extension of the detention must
be carefully tailored to the underlying justification for the stop.

Id. at 562-563.

"Accordingly, where officers abandon the initial purpose of a routine traffic stop and
extend it to allow for a drug dog search, the extension must be justified by a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012).
"Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell
within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior." State v.
Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180 (Ct. App. 2004).

In this case, Mr. Mathews does not challenge the validity of the initial stop for
speeding. The issue on appeal is further narrowed because Officer Bingham testified
that he abandoned the speeding investigation when he returned to his vehicle.
(Tr., p.98, L.1 - p.99, L.1.) In fact, the State conceded that "any delay in regards to the
calling of the drug dogs was not done during a time in which [Officer Bingham] was still
investigating the speeding ticket." (Tr., p.118, Ls.18-23.) As such, the narrow issue on
appeal is whether Officer Bingham had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop in
order to provide time for a drug dog to arrive at the scene and search 1 Mr. Mathews'

1

Mr. Mathews does not contend that the drug dog's sniff was a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
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car. Since, Officer Bingham began calling for drug dogs immediately after he returned
to his vehicle (R., p.78), the only information relevant to the determination of whether
Officer Bingham had reasonable suspicion to begin investigating for drug related activity
is the information Officer Bingham obtained during his first contact with Mr. Mathews.
This information consists of the communications between Officer Bingham and Officer
Bingham's observations of Mr. Mathews' vehicle.
Based on this information, the district court found four general factors which it
concluded justified Officer Bingham's decision to expand the purpose of the stop into an
investigation for drug activity. However, there were other non-suspicious factors which
were not analyzed by the district court which belie the conclusion that reasonable
suspicion existed to extend the stop. Officer Bingham did not observe anything on the
exterior of Mr. Mathews' car that was suspicious. (Tr., p.86, Ls.6-9.) He did not see
anything inside Mr. Mathews' car associated with drugs. (Tr., p.87, L.25 - p.88, L.6.)
Officer Bingham did not smell the order of marijuana, which Officer Bingham would
have recognized. (Tr., p.87, Ls.19-24.) Officer Bingham didn't think Mr. Mathews was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (Tr., p.78, Ls.12-15, p.88, Ls.7-13.) Officer
Bingham did not testify that Mr. Mathews was either coming from or going to a drug
trafficking destination. (See generally, Tr., p.11-p.108.) According to trial counsel, there
was no "drug activity tip, [no] bloodshot eyes, [and no] fumbling for paperwork."
(Tr., p.133, Ls.15-22, p.86, Ls.1-5.)

Officer Bingham testified that throughout their

conversation Mr. Mathews was calm, confident, and did not display signs of
nervousness. (Tr., p.61, Ls.15-19.)
Now turning to the factors the district court considered objectively suspicious.
The first factor identified by the district court was the food wrappers and the energy
8

drinks which, according to the court, created a "lived in" look indicating that
Mr. Mathews was in a hurry.

(R., p.84.) The second factor identified by the district

court was the map of Idaho, which was associated with drug activity as drug traffickers
prefer paper maps because GPS systems require destination information. (R., p.84.)
The district court's reliance on these two factors is misplaced as neither of them
were unique to Mr. Mathews and they were entirely consistent with his statement that
he was on a long road trip. Moreover, there is nothing unusual or suspicious about a
person on a long road trip having a messy car and an open map. There is persuasive
authority holding as such. For example, in overturning a court's finding of reasonable
suspicion, the 10th Circuit employed the following rationale in determining that the
presence of open maps and fast food wrappers are not factors which give rise to
reasonable suspicion:
The district court also concluded that the presence of fast-food
wrappers and open maps in the passenger compartment contributed to a
finding that reasonable suspicion existed. [The defendant] informed the
trooper of his travel itinerary-a cross-country trip through parts of the
country he had not seen before. The presence of open maps in the
passenger compartment is not only consistent with his explanation, but is
entirely consistent with innocent travel such that, in the absence of
contradictory information, it cannot reasonably be said to give rise to
suspicion of criminal activity. See Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 495 (3d
Cir.1995). Remnants from fast-food restaurants can probably be found on
the floor of many cars traveling the interstate highways, including many
traveling eastbound on Interstate 70. See id. at 496 (Fast-food wrappers
"have become ubiquitous in modern interstate travel and do not serve to
separate the suspicious from the innocent traveler."). The possession of
open maps and the vestiges of fast-food meals describes a very large
category of presumably innocent travelers, and any suspicion associated
with these items is virtually nonexistent.
United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see a/so U.S. v.
Farias, 43 F.Supp.2d 1276, 1283 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that the "presence of a road

atlas and fast food wrappers" in defendants' vehicle, which were consistent with the
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defendant's explanation of traveling on a long road trip, are not factors which contribute
to a finding of reasonable suspicion); State v. Richmond, 133 S.W.3d 576,580-581 (Mo.
App. S.D., 2004) (holding that defendant's nervousness, food containers, beverage
containers, an atlas in the passenger compartment, and the defendant's claim he was
traveling from Los Angeles to Michigan, did not support the officer's belief that criminal
activity was afoot); Meraz-Lopez v. State, 92 Ark. App. 157, 160-161 (Ark. App. 2005)
(holding that nervousness combined with "[t]he presence of a brand new cellular
telephone, new atlases, fast food, and energy drinks scattered in the front are
seemingly innocent.").

During cross-examination, Officer Bingham even testified that

energy drinks, food wrappers and water bottles are quite common possessions for
innocent individuals driving across the country. (Tr., p.92, L.19 - p.92, L.7.)
Additionally, the creditability of Officer Bingham's assertion that drug traffickers
prefer paper maps over GPS systems is suspect. While Officer Bingham did testify that
in his training drug traffickers prefer paper maps (Tr., p.22, L.9 - p.23, L.10), he never
provided any information indicating that in his experience he has arrested any drug
traffickers using paper maps to navigate. As such, Officer Bingham never testified that
he had first-hand experience with arresting drug traffickers that use paper maps. Officer
Bingham did testify that "a lot of people use GPS" systems.

(Tr., p.22, Ls.3-9.)

However, the mere assertion that a lot of people use GPS systems does not distinguish
Mr. Mathews' driving behavior from the rest of the population because it does not
establish that the majority of the population uses GPS systems.

As such, Officer

Bingham's testimony that a lot of people use GPS systems did not go far enough to
establish that people on long road trips in possession of paper maps are drug
traffickers.
10

The third factor relied on by the district, Mr. Mathews' stated travel plans, should
not be afforded much weight in the reasonable suspicion analysis. The district court
provided the following explanation supporting its conclusion that Mr. Mathews' travel
plans were suspicious:
When asked where he came from and what he was doing there,
[Mr. Mathews] told [Officer Bingham] that he drove cross-country from
Kansas to Reno, Nevada, to gamble at a gas station. When [Officer
Bingham] asked Mathews where he was headed, [Mr. Mathews] said he
was traveling to Kansas from Reno, via Cheyenne and Lincoln. [Officer
Bingham] knew that the most direct route from Reno to Cheyenne was on
Interstate 80 through Utah - a section of interstate that is well-known for
being patrolled for drug trafficking and could compel a trafficker to go far
out of his way to avoid detection there.
(R., pp.84-85.) The foregoing analysis was based on Officer Bingham's testimony that
he thought Mr. Mathews was intentionally avoiding the stretch of 1-80 which goes
through Utah to avoid contact with law enforcement. (Tr., p.65, L.10 - p.71, L.18.)
One major weakness in the district court's reliance on this factor is that it runs
contrary to established case law and, taken to its logical conclusion, would allow a
court to find a person's presence suspicious no matter where that person was pulled
over. In Danney, supra, the Court of Appeals held that one of the factors supporting
the holding that there was reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop in order for a
drug dog to arrive was the fact that Danney was pulled over in an area know for drug
trafficking. Danney, 153 Idaho at 411; see also State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277
(Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the ones presence in a high-crime area is an appropriate
factor to use when determining whether it is reasonable to search for weapons). Here,
the district court found that it was suspicious for Mr. Mathews to be present on a
roadway which is not well known for drug trafficking. (R., pp.84-85.) Based on this
logic, every person that gets pulled over either in an area known for drug trafficking or
11

an area not known for drug trafficking would considered a potential drug trafficker.
Such a finding is patently unreasonable.
Another weakness behind the district court's reliance on Mr. Mathews' travel
plans is that Officer Bingham never asked any questions as to Mr. Mathews' reason for
being in Idaho and, as such, that factor was really based on Officer's Bingham's
personal belief about Mr. Mathews' travel plans. If Officer Bingham's suspicions were
piqued by Mr. Mathews' travel plans, it makes little sense that Officer Bingham did not
ask Mr. Mathews why he was in Idaho.

During cross-examination, Officer Bingham

testified that he never asked Mr. Mathews if he had been to Idaho before. (Tr., p.93,
Ls.22-24.) Officer Bingham then testified that he never asked Mr. Mathews if he had
been to Twin Falls or if he was going to Twin Falls to watch base jumpers jump off
Perrine Bridge, which he agreed is an innocent reason for young people to visit Twin
Falls.

(Tr., p.93, L.25 - p.94, L.6.)

Since Officer Bingham had no idea why

Mr. Mathews was in Idaho, his assumption that he was avoiding Utah was merely
inchoate and unparticularized and, therefore, not a reasonable basis for the district
court's finding Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho was suspicious.

White, 496 U.S. at

329.
Further support for Mr. Mathews position can be found in State v. Morgan, 154
Idaho 109 (2013), where a police officer observed Morgan take a series of four left
turns.

Id. at 111.

The police officer concluded that Morgan's driving patter was an

attempt by Morgan to avoid the officer, so the officer stopped Morgan. Id. The Idaho
Supreme Court concluded the stop was unreasonable because "the officer provided no
factual justification for" his belief Morgan was attempting to avoid him. Id. at 112. The
Supreme Court went on to hold that "[a]bsent other circumstances, driving around the
12

block on a Friday night does not rise to the level of specific, articulable facts that justify
an investigatory stop." Id. In this case, Officer Bingham pulled over Mr. Mathews for
speeding and observed some common items in his car, i.e. a map and some garbage,
and assumed based on his personal belief that Mr. Mathews' was in Idaho to avoid a
stretch of 1-80 in Utah. Similar to the police officer in Morgan, Officer Bingham did not
articulate any fact specific to Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho to support the conclusion
that Mr. Mathews was in Idaho to avoid law enforcement in Utah.

As such,

Mr. Mathews' presence in Idaho should not be afforded much, if any, weight in the
reasonable suspicion determination.
The conclusion that Mr. Mathews' travel plans were suspicions is further belied
when Officer Bingham's rationale is analyzed. Officer Bingham testified that the energy
drinks and the food wrappers were suspicion because they indicate that Mr. Mathews
was in a hurry to get somewhere and drug traffickers try to hurry when traveling to
reduce the odds of interacting with law enforcement. (Tr., p.103, L.8 - p.104, L.10.) If
Mr. Mathews was in a hurry to get home, it makes little sense for him to take a detour
from the direct route to Kansas.

The logic of Officer Bingham breaks down further

because the original reason for the stop was speeding. If a drug trafficker is willing to
take long detours and avoid stopping to eat to avoid interactions with law enforcement,
it makes little sense for that person to undermine all those precautions by breaking a
simple law like speeding which significantly increases the odds of interacting with law
enforcement. See State v. Nevarez, 147 Idaho 470, 475-476 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that driving well below the speed limit is suspicious because it is a means to avoid
contact with law enforcement). Moreover, if driving below the speed limit can create
suspicion, it follows that driving above the speed limit would not create suspicion
13

because a drug trafficker trying to avoid detection by law enforcement would not draw
the attention of law enforcement by speeding.
The district court did note that it found Mr. Mathews' decision to go to Reno
Nevada to gamble at a gas station was somewhat suspicious because he could have
gambled at a gas station in eastern Nevada. (R., p.85, n.5.) There could have been
totally innocent explanations for Mr. Mathews to gamble in Reno, but Officer Bingham
failed to ask enough questions for that fact alone to be suspicious.

For example,

Mr. Mathews could have had a friends or family that live in Reno. He might have sought
a specific place to gamble because it supposedly had a higher win rate than his other
options.

Mr. Mathews did gamble at more than one establishment.

(R., pp.9.)

Mr. Mathews might have gambled at the first place lost then got lucky at the gas station
and decided to stay there.

He might have also wanted to visit Reno because it is

"America's Biggest Little City."

Since Officer Bingham never found out why

Mr. Mathews was in Reno gambling, his suspicion that this was associated with drug
trafficking is unreasonable as it was not particularized. White, 496 U.S. at 329.
The fourth and final factor relied on by the district court to determine there was
reasonable suspicion to extend the stop was the fact that after Mr. Mathews was asked
if he had contraband in his vehicle he calmly, and without any display of nervousness,
removed his sunglass, looked Officer Bingham in the eye, and said that he did not have
any controlled substances in his car. (R., p.85; Tr., p.61-Ls.12-19.)
The district court's reliance on this as a factor to support a finding of reasonable
suspicion is at odds with the relevant case law.

For example, the Idaho Court of

Appeals has held that "[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor that may
contribute to reasonable suspicion." Nevarez, 147 Idaho 470, at 475-476. Moreover, in
14

State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406 (Ct. App. 1994), the Court of Appeals held the fact

that the defendant hid his face while speaking with an officer was a factor which
objectively supported the conclusion that the officer had reasonable suspicion that the
defendant was engaging in criminal activity.

Id. at 410.

In State v. Grantham, 146

Idaho 490 (Ct. App. 2008), the defendant was asked by an officer if she had marijuana.
Id. at. 494. The defendant then made eye contact with the officer and denied having

any marijuana.

Id.

The officer then asked the defendant if she had any

methamphetamine and the defendant "turned away, avoided eye contact, and did not
answer."

Id.

The Idaho Court of Appeals held that a factor which supported the

determination that reasonable suspicion existed was the fact that the defendant's
"demeanor changed visibly when asked whether there was methamphetamine in the car
as compared to other drugs." Id. at 497.
In this case, Mr. Mathews displayed behaviors which were the opposite of the
defendant's in the foregoing cases and consistent with the behavior of an innocent
individual. In Nevarez, the Court of Appeals held nervousness and evasive behavior is
suspicion. Nevarez, 147 Idaho at 475-476. Here, Mr. Mathews was neither nervous
nor evasive. (Tr., p.61, Ls.12-19.) In Troughton, it was held that hiding one's face from
police is suspicious. Troughton, 126 Idaho at 410. In this case, Mr. Mathews looked
the officer directly in the eye the exact opposite of hiding his face. (Tr., p.61, L.19-62,
L.3.)

In Grantham, suspicious behavior was found when the defendant made eye

contact when

asked

about

marijuana,

but looked

away when

asked

about

methamphetamine. Grantham, 146 Idaho at 494-497. It is important to note, that the
Grantham Court did not find it suspicious for the defendant to look the officer in the eye

when asked about marijuana.

Id.

Suspicious behavior was only found when the
15

defendant

looked

away

from

the

officer

when

subsequently

asked

about

methamphetamine. Id. Here, Mr. Mathews was not nervous and did not display any
evasive behavior when he looked Officer Bingham in the eye and denied having drugs.
As such, Mr. Mathews' behavior when asked incriminating questions was the opposite
of behavior the Idaho Court of Appeals has held suspicious.
A holding that Mr. Mathews' behavior was suspicious would create precedent
where any reaction in response to an incriminating question by law enforcement would
create suspicion. Thus, a bright-line rule allowing officers to detain a car until a drug
dog could "search" would be established so long as police ask an incriminating
question. As argued above, Mr. Mathews' behavior was the opposite of the behavior in
the foregoing cases which was determined suspicious. If evasive behavior or the lack
of evasive behavior can be construed as suspicious then every time a person is asked
an incriminating question by law enforcement the response would always be construed
as suspicious. This unreasonableness of such a holding would be compounded by the
district court's conclusion, supra, that being present in an area not known for drug
trafficking is suspicious.

Such a double sided rule would run afoul the rule which

precludes suspicion to be found for conduct that can be described as normal behavior.
Roe, 140 Idaho 180.

In sum, Mr. Mathews' behavior when interacting with Officer Bingham was
normal behavior. The items located in Mr. Mathews' car were normal and consistent his
travel plans. Officer Bingham had no idea why Mr. Mathews was in Idaho. Similarly,
Officer Bingham had no idea why Mr. Mathews decided to go to Reno, Nevada to
gamble. When these factors are taken into consideration with the fact that there was no
overt facts in this record directly associating Mr. Mathews with either drugs or alcohol
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they support the conclusion that district court erred when it denied Mr. Mathews' motion
to suppress.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Mathews respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 10th day of July, 2013.
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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